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Abstract
The US and the EU recently introduced regulation to curb the extent of risky
off-label drug use.It offers manufacturers a prolongation of patent protection
or exclusivity if they invest in pediatric clinical tests. This paper shows that a
reinforcement of physician liability for off-label use may be the preferred in-
strument for achieving dynamic efficiency.The liability threat reduces the de-
mand for off-label use, giving manufacturers an appropriate incentive to in-
vest in extended approval. By contrast, patent prolongation does not affect
physicians' prescription decisions and increases the likelihood of investments
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. Furthermore, the function lies 
above the diagonal λθ =
7
 
￿ otherwise sales would not increase under label use ￿ and has a 
positive slope:
8 














A manufacturer will invest in extended approval where  () λλ θ > %  (see the hatched area in Figure 
1). When  () ≤ % λλ θ  off-label use will prevail. 
 












If demand for the drug under label use exceeds demand for off-label use because  , λθ >  the 
manufacturer is more likely to invest the more sales increase with label use. A high drug price 
also increases the probability of an investment. The comparative static analysis also shows that 
                                                            
7  See Appendix B for proof. 
8  For the uniform distribution with  1 =
b f ,  ()
x
b Fx= , and 
1 Fx
− = , we obtain  () [] = + % b









the incentive for gaining extended approval becomes stronger if testing costs are low, the drug 
price is high, patent duration is long and expected damages are large.  
Figure 2 characterizes the private decisions from the perspectives of dynamic and static 
efficiency. θ  indicates the minimal damage decrease due to testing that renders the investment in 
extended approval socially beneficial. For θθ < , the manufacturer will comply with the social 
optimum if condition (7) is fulfilled, e.g.  () λλ θ > %  (hatched rectangle). In this case, the expected 
additional period profits from label drug use are sufficiently large, as physicians prescribe much 
more than under off-label use. Static efficiency is also achieved, since physicians use the correct 
information in their treatment decisions. 
 
Figure 2: Static and dynamic efficiency of private decisions 


















By contrast, a lower risk perception of physicians increases demand for off-label use. This in turn 
decreases expected additional period profits from label drug use and thus deters the manufacturer 
from undertaking socially worthwhile investment in additional testing ( () ≤ % λλ θ ). Due to the 
underestimated damages, the resulting demand for off-label use will be inefficiently high (shaded 
area). 
When off-label use is the first-best regime,  ≥ θθ , a manufacturer￿s choice will be consistent if 11 
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the new label-use market but also to the original label-use market. Additional sales in the original 
market have a leverage effect on the investment decision. Investment is then more likely both in 
situations where this is socially indicated and situations where it is not.  
Alternatively, let us consider the possibilities of enforced physician liability to induce the correct 
investment decision and the first-best amount of drug consumption. Here, the patent duration 
remains unchanged at P years.  
Due to the biased estimation of possible damage to the patients 1 λ < , off-label demand is 
generally different from the socially optimal choice. Assume that a multiplier m applies to 
expected damages,  [ ] mE D , in the off-label use regime where physicians are held liable for 
damages from treatment. The physician￿s expected utility then changes to 
() () [] 1
b
bxfx d x F bmE D λ −− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫  and the treatment threshold becomes  [ ] mED λ . Demand for 
off-label use finally is  [ ] () 1 FmED λ −  and decreases with the multiplier:  










λ . (12) 
It follows that the multiplier  
1 o m
λ
=  (13) 
will correct for physicians￿ biased expectations and thus restore static efficiency. The question 
remains, however, whether the multiplier will also suffice to achieve dynamic efficiency.  
Consider first  < θθ , where dynamic inefficiency arises if  () λλ θ ≤ % . Since  ()1 λθ < %  an even 
smaller multiplier than 
o m  would do to restore dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency is 
reached when a multiplier equal to  
() min 1 m =<
% λθ
λ
   (14) 
is applied. The manufacturer will invest in extended approval, since the resulting additional sales 
are sufficiently high to recoup the fixed costs. If investments take place, static efficiency will also 
be restored, assuming that information from the drug approval process realigns physicians￿ 
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